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This note proposes a research agenda for studying the implications of enhanced capital
mobility and limited de facto exchange rate flexibility for the conduct of macroeconomic
stabilization. The ineffectiveness of monetary policy under such conditions suggests a greater
role for fiscal policy as a stabilization instrument. The paper outlines a methodology for
empirically verifying whether financially more open economies with a preference for
exchange rate regimes with limited de facto flexibility implement a more counter-cyclical
fiscal policy. Empirical testing of this hypothesis at the cross-national level is nonetheless
hindered by data availability. Statistics on cyclically adjusted budget balances are typically
available for OECD member countries only, but this sample offers little variation in terms of
de facto exchange rate regime choice.
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In the Mundell-Fleming open economy model with perfect capital mobility and fixed 
exchange rates, fiscal policy - unlike monetary policy - can be used to stabilize output. Recent 
evidence on the evolution of exchange rate systems since the demise of the Bretton Woods 
system suggests that truly flexible exchange rate systems have in fact been rare. Does this imply 
that globalization enhances the role of fiscal policy in economic stabilization? 
Rodrik (1998) found an empirically strong positive relationship between trade openness 
and government size, suggesting that government spending plays a risk-reducing role in open 
economies. Globalization in terms of trade and capital flows has both macro- and micro-
economic implications. International trade can have strong distributional effects. For instance, 
the widening income gap between skilled and unskilled workers in mature economies puts 
increased demands on compensatory fiscal policy in the form of social insurance in the short run, 
and public investment in education over the long term. In developing countries, enhanced 
international capital mobility has further highlighted the significance of public infrastructure 
investment as a factor in attracting foreign investment and participation in international trade.  
    This note directs attention to the financial aspects of globalization and their 
macroeconomic implications. The 1990s were characterized by an upsurge in private capital 
flows, and developing countries have been important players in this expansion. Figure 1 shows 
that net private capital flows to low and middle income countries increased tenfold between 1985 
and 1997, reaching USD 275.5 bil. at their peak in 1997 (World Development Indicators, World 
Bank). Another important feature of international capital flows is their large degree of volatility.
1  
In parallel to these developments, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has reported 
that most countries have moved away from the rigid exchange rate arrangements that 
characterized the Bretton Woods system. During the 1970s most developing countries, as well as 
smaller industrialized nations, continued to peg their official exchange rates to a single or a 
basket of major currencies. The 1980s and 1990s saw experimentation with more explicitly 
flexible forms of exchange rate regimes. According to the IMF, the proportion of developing 
countries employing some form of a fixed regime decreased from around 90 percent in 1975 to 
below 50 percent in the late 1990s. A similar pattern of increased flexibility can be detected in 
the case of more developed economies when exchange rate systems are classified in official 
terms.
2 
However, a number of empirical studies of exchange rate regimes have highlighted the 
large degree of variation in regime characteristics within the same official IMF classification.
3 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2004), Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003, 2005) and Poirson (2001) 
introduced measures of de facto exchange rate regimes and documented a divergence between de 
facto and official or de jure declarations of regime by individual governments. Once de facto 
exchange rate regime measures are taken into account, the tendency towards more flexible forms 
of regime during the 1980s and 1990s is not so obvious any longer. These studies have found 
that truly flexible regimes are rare.  These are typically large economies with well developed 
                                                 
1 The Asian and Russian crises of 1997 and 1998 respectively are a good case in point. For a discussion of the 
characteristics and determinants of the microstructure of global capital flows see for example IMF (2001). 
2 There are notable exceptions to these patterns including the formation of the European Monetary System (EMS) 
and later the European Monetary Union (EMU). A number of developing countries have also chosen less flexible 
regimes during this period. 
3 For official IMF classification see Annual Report on Exchange Rate Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions.     1
financial markets such as the United States, Japan and the new European Monetary Union 
(EMU). Most of the countries in the world significantly lag behind in the degree of de facto 
regime flexibility they allow. These findings are consistent across the mentioned studies despite 
the variation in the method of measuring de facto exchange regime. 
The IMF revised its classification of exchange rate regimes in 1997 and 1999. The new 
classification is more disaggregated and is intended to be a de facto categorization. Nevertheless, 
large discrepancies remain between the IMF classification, and other discrete and continuous 
measures of de facto regime in the literature. For this reason, most researchers continue to regard 
the IMF classification as a de jure declaration of regime. See for example von Hagen and Zhou 
(2004b). 
Table 1 provides a cross-tabulation of de facto and de jure exchange rate classifications 
by von Hagen and Zhou (2004a) for 112 developing countries between 1978 and 2000. The table 
demonstrates that in de facto terms, fixed regimes are more prevalent and floats more scarce in 
developing countries than the IMF classification would suggest. 
  Why do countries continue to exhibit a preference for exchange rate regimes with limited 
flexibility while officially declaring a more flexible form of regime management? The surge in 
international capital flows during the 1990s can help explain the growing number of formally 
flexible regimes. The lack of explicit commitment to maintaining a fixed exchange rate reduces 
intervention costs in the face of potential speculative attacks under a peg.  
At the same time, the revealed preference for de facto exchange rate stability is likely to 
be linked to large holdings of domestic liabilities by non-residents. The so-called ‘fear of 
floating’ literature explains the motivation to de facto peg a currency as means of hedging a 
country’s burden of foreign currency liabilities and/or the value of its foreign assets (see Calvo 
and Reinhart (2000), Hausmann et al. (2001)).  
Maintaining a stable regime reduces the probability of default on foreign currency 
denominated liabilities, attracts more foreign capital, and thus reduces risk premia and interest 
rates to the benefit of domestic borrowers. For instance, Hausmann et al. (1999) find that flexible 
exchange rate regimes in Latin America from the 1960s through the 1990s were associated with 
higher real interest rates, smaller financial systems, and greater sensitivity of domestic interest 
rates to movements in international rates than fixed exchange rate arrangements. 
Hakura (2005) argues that emerging market economies have been ‘learning to float’. The 
paper derives estimates of monetary policy independence based on the sensitivity of domestic 
interest rates to international interest rates for 21 emerging markets over the period 1992-2003. 
The estimates of monetary independence are then tabulated across exchange rate regimes using 
the revised IMF classification. Still, the results reveal a large degree of variation in the degree of 
estimated monetary independence among countries classified in the same exchange rate regime 
category. Moreover, the majority of the countries in the sample classified as free float or 
managed float exhibit a strong and statistically significant positive correlation between domestic 
and foreign interest rates. This is symptomatic of a lack of monetary independence. The results 
thus seem to be in congruence with the findings of the literature on de facto regime choice rather 
then validating the IMF’s regime classification as a truly de facto categorization.  
This paper outlines the implications of enhanced capital mobility and limited de facto 
exchange rate flexibility for the conduct of macroeconomic stabilization. The Mundell-Fleming 
model suggests that monetary policy becomes ineffective under such circumstances, and Hakura 
(2005) provides some empirical confirmation for emerging markets in this regard. Hence, does 
or should this imply a greater emphasis on fiscal policy to support output growth in a Keynesian   2
demand-constrained open economy? In other words, is the fiscal policy stance more counter-
cyclical in countries that are financially open and have a de facto fixed exchange rate regime?  
Galí and Perotti (2003) estimate empirically fiscal policy rules for eleven EMU countries 
that officially relinquished monetary policy control as of 1999.
4 They find that discretionary 
budget deficits have in fact become more counter-cyclical in the member countries of the EMU 
after the implementation of the Maastricht Treaty over the period 1997-2001 relative to 1988-92. 
While this result is broadly consistent with the hypothesis presented in this paper, they also find 
a similar trend in other OECD countries. 
Extending the analysis of Galí and Perotti (2003) to all OECD countries and 
incorporating the control variables suggested by our hypothesis, would unfortunately not provide 
sufficient variation in regime choice. Current EMU countries, and new EU states aspiring to 
future membership in the monetary union, make up a significant part of the OECD group. At the 
same time, expanding the sample to non-OECD countries poses new challenges in terms of data 
availability. Data on fiscal policy stance that allow distinguishing between discretionary and 
automatic spending are provided by the OECD for member countries only.  
Consequently, this paper outlines the agenda and methodology for future empirical 
testing of the hypothesis that financial globalization and a revealed preference for exchange rate 
regimes with limited de facto flexibility imply a more-proactive role for fiscal policy in 
macroeconomic stabilization. The paper is organized as follows: Section two briefly reviews the 
relevant literature. Section three provides an overview of the methodology for cyclically 
adjusting budget balances. Section four describes the model specifications for empirical testing. 
Section five concludes with a call for developing an internationally comparable database on 
cyclically adjusted fiscal statistics. 
 
2. Fiscal policy effectiveness 
 
Hemming et al. (2002) provide an extensive review of the theoretical and empirical 
literature on the effectiveness of fiscal policy in stimulating economic activity, primarily as 
measured by the magnitude of a fiscal multiplier. Spanning the theoretical literature the paper 
identifies a set of conditions under which fiscal multipliers will generally tend to be positive and 
quite large. In other words, factors that enhance the effectiveness of fiscal stimulus include: 
-  a demand constrained economy with excess capacity; 
-  a closed economy or an open economy with a fixed exchange rate; 
-  households with limited horizons or liquidity constraints; 
-  increased government spending does not substitute for private spending, it enhances the 
productivity of factors of production; 
-  lower taxes increase labour supply and/or investment; 
-  government debt is low and the government does not face financing constraints; 
-  a simultaneous monetary expansion with limited inflationary consequences. 
The 1990s were characterized by a perception that reducing the size of the government 
through spending cuts and tax breaks is likely to have a positive impact on output growth. The 
theoretical underpinnings of an expansionary fiscal contraction (or a negative fiscal multiplier) 
include:  
                                                 
4 Galí and Perotti (2003) investigate whether the limitations imposed on fiscal policy conduct by the Maastricht 
Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact impede the ability of EMU governments to implement macroeconomic 
stabilization.   3
-  direct crowding out of private provision of output by government provision; 
-  indirect crowding out as interest rates rise and a flexible exchange rate appreciates in 
response to a fiscal expansion; 
-  household behavior conforming to Ricardian equivalence; 
-  issues of debt sustainability, credibility loss and high risk premia on interest rates. 
Most of the empirical findings in the literature relate to OECD countries. Estimates of 
fiscal multipliers are typically positive yet small, and government spending multipliers are 
systematically larger than those of tax cuts. Negative fiscal multipliers or expansionary fiscal 
contractions are empirically rare, but they can be generated by incorporating credibility effects 
into macroeconomic simulation models.  
Another stream of research focuses on the size of government and macroeconomic 
volatility. Studies in this area typically find a negative association between government size as a 
percentage of GDP and macroeconomic volatility.  For example, the analysis of Galí (1994) in 
the context of a real business cycle model suggests that government purchases have a stabilizing 
effect on output variability for most model specifications considered, and the results are even 
stronger empirically using data for OECD countries. Fatas and Mihov (2001) also show that 
increase in government spending relative to GDP reduces output volatility in their study of 
OECD countries and US states.  
Rodrik (1998) points out the endogeneity between the determination of government size 
and macroeconomic volatility. In his political economy framework open economies, which are 
inherently more volatile, demand larger government as a compensatory device.  
    Other political economy models on the microfoundations of public finance typically 
incorporate distributional conflict. In general, voter heterogeneity leads to redistributive conflict 
and larger government size as a means of placating political opposition. The works of Alesina 
and Spolaore (1997), Persson et al. (1998), Persson and Tabellini (1999), Annett (2001), and 
Tridimas and Winer (2005) serve as the benchmarks of this literature. 
Among the institutional aspects of fiscal policy relevant to the conduct of macroeconomic 
stabilization are the lags in the implementation process. First of all, it takes time to detect a 
downturn in the economy, decide on the appropriate policy response and to actually adjust fiscal 
policy. Such lags - also referred to as inside lags - are at least partly a function of the political 
process and the structure of fiscal management. The greater the reliance on automatic stabilizers 
rather than discretionary measures in a system of public finances, the shorter the inside lags are 
likely to be. Outside lags on the other hand refer to the time period it takes for the fiscal 
measures to feed through to aggregate demand. Outside lags tend to be shorter for transfers and 
income tax cuts targeted at households facing liquidity constraints. 
Consequently, using aggregate budget deficits in the analysis of the cyclical nature of 
fiscal policy is likely to be inadequate. Careful differentiation among fiscal components with 
various degrees of inside and outside lags seems inevitable. Distinguishing between automatic 
stabilizers and discretionary tools in fiscal policy conduct, however, poses significant data and 
methodological challenges. 
 
3. Cyclically adjusted budget balances 
 
Since fluctuations in economic activity affect government budget balances, fiscal data 
need to be adjusted for such cyclical influences. Additionally, the adjustment method should 
account for the simultaneity problem between the business cycle and budget balances:   4
macroeconomic fluctuations affect the fiscal position which, in turn, impacts on economic 
activity. A number of papers provide guidance on the methodological issues associated with 
cyclically adjusting budget data, among these are, for example, Giorno et al. (1995), Hagemann 
(1999), van den Noord (2000), Bouthevillain et al. (2001), and Galí and Perotti (2003).  
The components of the analysis include estimating the elasticities of taxes and public 
expenditures with respect to output, the output gap and their impact on budget components. The 
adjusted figures are point estimates sensitive to the choice of the method for de-trending 
macroeconomic data, the treatment of structural breaks and elasticity estimates. Most studies 
typically employ the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter or production function based estimates of 
potential output.  Elasticity estimates integrate information from the tax code, distribution of tax 
payers across income brackets or involve regression estimates of tax revenue on GDP. Among 
the institutions providing such data components for cyclically adjusted budget balances are the 
OECD, IMF and the European Commission, but coverage is typically limited to OECD 
countries. As outlined above, the OECD sample does not offer sufficient variation in terms of de 
facto exchange rate regime choice for an empirical analysis accounting for the endogenous 
evolution of regime choice, financial openness and fiscal rules. 
To illustrate in simplest terms the structure of analysis, we follow van den Noord (2000) 
and Galí and Perotti (2003). Let Yt* denote the reference value of GDP calculated by an output-
smoothing method such as trend or HP-filtered GDP, or potential output. Then structural tax 
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where α  and β denote the output elasticity of tax revenues and spending respectively; and Tt and 
Gt stand for actual tax revenues and government expenditures (excluding capital and interest 
spending). The degree of decomposition can be enhanced through differentiation among tax and 
spending categories.
5 
Dividing structural tax revenues Tt* and spending Gt* by the reference value of output 










=         ( 2 )  
Note that the structural deficit in equation (2) is further adjusted for non-tax revenues 
minus interest on public debt minus net capital outlays, denoted by Xt. 
The cyclical component of the budget balance, bt**, is then calculated as the difference 
between the actual budget balance bt (expressed as ratio to actual output) and the structural 
budget balance bt* (as share of potential output). 
* * *
t t t b b b − =          ( 3 )  
For detailed derivations and methodological issues in the estimation of the output 
elasticities of tax revenues and spending, α and β respectively, the reader may refer to Giorno et 
al. (1995), van den Noord (2000), Bouthevillain et al. (2001) or OECD (2002). It is worth noting 
at this point that the bulk of the research effort for calculating cyclically adjusted budget 
balances lies in the estimation of the elasticities of tax revenues and government spending with 
respect to output. 
                                                 
5 For example, van den Noord (2000) distinguishes among four tax categories: corporate, personal income, social 
security and indirect tax.   5
 
4. Empirical modeling 
 
This section outlines a methodology for empirically testing the hypothesis that financially 
more open economies with a revealed preference for exchange rate regimes with little de facto 
flexibility are induced to exercise more countercyclical fiscal policy. Fiscal policy can be 
approximated using structural (discretionary) budget balances, or in terms of cyclical budget 
balances, also interpreted as automatic stabilizers.  
This paper suggests a two-step procedure for the empirical test. The first step involves 
quantifying the degree to which fiscal policy is counter- or pro-cyclical in individual countries 
over a certain time period using structural and/or cyclical budget balances as outlined in the 
previous section. In the second step, the estimated measures of fiscal policy stance can be used in 
a cross-sectional or panel regression relating them to variables of de facto regime choice, capital 
flows and their interaction term.  
Following Galí and Perotti (2003) first estimate individual country-specific fiscal rules 
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*
1 1 1
* α α α α    for each country i   (4) 
where bt
* is the structural budget deficit as share of potential output, xt
 is the output gap and dt
* is 
the size of public debt relative to potential GDP.  The lagged dependent variable is included to 
account for the likely autocorrelation of budget decisions due to, for example, gradual 
adjustment to a fiscal target or serial correlation in exogenous shocks.  
In order to account for lags in the implementation of discretionary fiscal policy, expected 
output lagged by one period is employed in the analysis. Galí and Perotti (2003) estimate 
equation (4) for EMU countries by replacing Et-1xt
 with xt, and instrumenting it by xt-1 and the 
lagged values of the output gap of a reference country which is likely to be correlated. The 
estimated coefficients αx
i on the expected output gap then serve as indicators of fiscal stance: 
more negative values indicate a more counter-cyclical fiscal policy. 
  Since Figure 1 illustrates that there seems to be a structural break in financial integration 
in the 1990s, the measures of fiscal policy stance for the 1990s could be compared with the 
corresponding figures for the 1980s to test if they are statistically different. Galí and Perotti 
(2003) perform a similar test for EMU countries before and after the Maastricht Treaty. 
The second step involves estimating the following panel regression 
jt jt jt jt jt jt jt x p f r f r ε β β β β β α + + + + + = 4 3 2 1 0 ,
     (5) 
where rjt is a de facto exchange rate regime variable (decreasing in terms of regime flexibility),  
fjt is a measure of financial openness and pjt can be control variable(s) representing political 
institutions. In terms of experimentation with the above basic model specification, additional 
control variables could include a measure of exchange rate regime tenure, GDP per capita or 
country size. To proxy for the degree of financial development, financial openness could be also 
interacted with GDP per capita. The explanatory variables should be averaged over a number of 
years in order to capture their systemic nature and avoid outliers driving the results, and to 
counter endogeneity problems.  
In terms of specific data sources, Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) provide a measure of de 
facto exchange rate regime for a large sample of developing and industrialized countries, and the 
World Bank’s gross private capital flows as a percentage of GDP can serve as an indicator of 
financial openness. Institutional variables representing the political system can be included to 
account for characteristics of decision-making that might influence the government’s ability to   6
implement a timely fiscal response to output shocks. For example, political variables could 
account for presidential vs. parliamentary systems, government fractionalization and similar 
factors suggested by the political economy literature on the micro-foundations of public finance.
6  
The World Bank’s Database of Political Institutions by Beck et al. (2001) represents a good 
source of cross-country data. 
Hence, in terms of our hypothesis, the coefficient β3 on the interaction term of de facto 
regime and financial openness is expected to have a negative sign.  
Potential endogeneity problems between the fiscal stance, exchange rate regime and 





This paper identifies a potential challenge for macroeconomic stabilization in the era of 
enhanced financial integration. Empirical evidence on exchange rate regimes has highlighted the 
persistence of systems with limited de facto flexibility to date. Combined with a dramatic 
increase in the degree of financial openness during the 1990s, the Mundell-Fleming open 
economy model implies that fiscal, rather than monetary, policy can be effectively employed in 
macroeconomic stabilization. Consequently, such an economic environment should induce fiscal 
policy conduct to be more counter-cyclical.  
Unfortunately, empirical testing of the proposed hypothesis entails significant challenges 
in terms of data availability. Data on cyclically adjusted budget balances and output gaps are 
typically available for OECD member countries only, but this sample offers little variation in 
terms of de facto exchange rate regime choice due to the prevalence of EMU member countries 
and aspiring new entrants. At the same time, expanding the dataset to non-OECD countries 
presents large resource requirements in terms of information and estimation that would be best 
tackled by organizations such as the IMF or the World Bank.  
Recognition of the need for improved data availability on cyclically adjusted budget 
balances comparable over a large sample of countries would be the first step not only towards 
empirically testing the hypothesis presented here, but also for a better understanding of fiscal 




                                                 
6 See Alesina and Perotti (1995), Alesina and Spolaore (1997), Persson et al. (1998), Persson and Tabellini (1999), 
Annett (2001), Tridimas and Winer (2005), for example.    7
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Table 1: Cross-classification of de facto and de jure exchange rate regimes 
(112 developing countries, 1978-2000) 
   Levy-Yeyati & Sturzenegger (2005)  Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) 
Regime  IMF  0 1 2 0  1  2 


























































Note: Numbers in parentheses are percentage shares of row sums reported in the IMF column. Numbers in brackets 
are percentage shares of the total number of observations, which is 1805. Source: von Hagen and Zhou (2004a) 
 
 
 